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ON APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ISSUED BY THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE RAY M, HARDING, JUDGE. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT KEVIN ROSEMAN 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this matter is proper pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented is as follows: 
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in this 
matter based upon its interpretation of Utah Code Annotated 
§41-6-38 and the uncontroverted evidence presented? 
In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a summary judgment 
motion, this Court reviews the matter for correctness. Mountain 
States Tel, & Tel. Co, v. Garfield County, 811 P,2d 184 (Utah 
1991) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
This matter is governed by Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-38: 
TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 
ARTICLE 4 ACCIDENTS 
Sec, 41-6-38. Livestock on highway—Restrictions— 
Collision, action for damages 
(1) A person owning or in possession or control of any 
livestock, may not willfully or negligently permit any of 
the livestock to stray or remain unaccompanied by a 
person in charge or control of the livestock upon a 
highway, both sides of which are adjoined by property 
which is separated from the highway by a fence, wall, 
hedge, sidewalk, curb, lawn, or building. This 
subsection does not apply to range stock drifting onto 
any highway in going to or returning from their 
accustomed ranges. 
(2) A person may not drive any livestock upon, over, or 
across any highway during the period from half an hour 
after sunset to half an hour before sunrise, without 
keeping a sufficient number of herders with warning 
lights on continual duty to open the road to permit the 
passage of vehicles. 
(3) In any civil action brought by the owner, operator, 
or occupant of a motor vehicle or by their personal 
representatives or assignees, or by the owner of the 
livestock for damages caused by collision with any 
domestic animal or animals on a highway, there is no 
presumption that the collision was due to negligence on 
behalf of the owner or the person in possession of 
livestock. 
As last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Summary, the Appellants fail in three areas; they fail to 
cite relevant legal precedent defining the scope of duty owed to 
the public by the owner of livestock and they fail to direct the 
Courtfs attention to the binding precedent. 
Secondly, Appellants claim a dispute of facts and rely upon 
the testimony of a witness that was not previously presented to the 
Court. 
Lastly, the owner or possessor of livestock must have 
contributed to the animal's presence there in a tangible and direct 
way to be liable for damage resulting from their presence on a 
highway, appellants fail to present evidence which would support 
this conclusion in the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS APPEAL IS NOT WELL TAKEN BECAUSE APPELLANT 
HAS FAILED TO CITE THE RELEVANT LEGAL PRECEDENT 
Appellant has failed to cite the relevant legal precedent to 
the Court in defining the scope of the duty owed to the public by 
the owner of livestock. Appellant does note the existence of Utah 
Code Annotated 41-6-38, but fails to direct the Court's attention 
to the binding precedent which interprets this statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court held, in Rhiness v. Dansie, 472 P. 2d 
428 (Utah 1970) , that the mere fact that an animal had escaped from 
its enclosure and was on the highway was not sufficient to show 
negligence on the part of the owner of the animal. The Court again 
upheld this interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-38(3) and 
Salt Lake County Ordinance § 10-10-3 to mean that specific acts of 
the individual, directly allowing, sanctioning or encouraging the 
animal to be in the road were required in Hornsbv v. Corp of 
Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929 (Utah 1988), (adopting rule of 
Santanello v. Cooper, 475 P.2d 246 (Ariz. 1970)). 
Appellants did not present evidence that Roseman sanctioned 
the presence of the horse on the highway. The uncontroverted 
evidence showed that the events complained of took place without 
his knowledge or presence, but in his absence. The testimony by 
both Roseman and Defendant Erickson, submitted to the trial court 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, was uncontroverted by 
Plaintiffs. The plaintiffs failed to show facts that would raise 
a material issue as to whether or not Defendant Roseman 
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specifically allowed and sanctioned the presence of his horse on 
the highway, as defined by the Supreme Court in these cases. 
Plaintiffs presented opinion testimony that the latch securing 
the gate on the Erickson property was defective in design, allowing 
a clever enough horse to open the gate by use of its head, 
hindquarters, or other part of the body. (R203-202) Respondent 
Roseman asked the Court to assume arguendo that this theory was 
true, and view the facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, maintaining that this 
did not make out even a prima facie case against Roseman. The 
owner of the property is generally responsible for its condition, 
unless this is modified in some way. Here, the only possible 
modification that may have existed is the lease executed by Roseman 
and Erickson on May 7, 1989. (R217) This lease determines 
Roseman's affirmative duties in this agreement: 
111. He is to furnish feed when needed 
2. Maintain fence gate11 
This agreement does not place Roseman under a duty to improve the 
property in any way, only to repair breakage or wear and tear. 
Applying the plain meaning test to the word "maintain", it is not 
possible to read into it a duty to make improvements. Blackfs Law 
Dictionary defines the word "maintain" as follows: 
Maintain. The term is variously defined as acts of 
repairs and other acts to prevent a decline, lapse or 
cessation from existing state or condition; bear the 
expense of; carry on; commence; continue; furnish means 
for subsistence or existence of; hold; hold or keep in an 
existing state or condition; hold or preserve in any 
particular state or condition; keep from change; keep 
from falling, declining or ceasing; keep in existence or 
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continuance; keep in force; keep in good order; keep in 
proper condition; keep in repair; keep up; preserve; 
preserve from lapse, decline failure or cessation; 
provide for; rebuild; repair; replace; supply with means 
of support; supply with what is needed; support; 
sustain; uphold. Negatively stated, it is defined as not 
to lose or surrender, not to suffer to fail or decline. 
Under the plain terms of the agreement, Roseman was under a duty to 
keep the fence and gate in the same condition as he found them, to 
preserve them from decay. Any underlying design defect would be 
the responsibility of the latch's designer and builder and/or 
owner. Mr. Roseman was not the designer, builder or owner of said 
latch. Therefore, no legal basis was presented upon which the 
plaintiffs could have prevailed. Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P. 2d 64 
(Utah 1984) . Summary Judgment was properly granted in this matter. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER IN THIS MATTER 
BECAUSE THERE IS NO DISPUTE AS TO FACTS. 
Appellants claim a dispute of facts, relying apparently upon 
the testimony of a witness that was not presented to the Court 
below. Appellants properly direct this Court's attention to Rule 
56(e), which states that affidavits are only required when a party 
is claiming disputes of fact. Specifically, the Rule states: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported 
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. URCP 56(e) 
This Court may not consider evidence not presented in the 
matter below. Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P. 2d 843, 847 (Utah App. 
1994); Low v. Bonacci, 788 P.2d 512, 513 (Utah 1990); LeBaron & 
Assoc, v. Rebel Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah App. 1991); 
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Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989). 
A statement by counsel that a factual issue exists, unsupported by 
affidavit or other evidence, does not create an issue of fact. D&L 
Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989); Bradshaw v. Beaver 
City, 27 Utah 2d 135, 493 P.2d 643 (1972). Appellants are now 
attempting to bolster their case after the fact with evidence not 
presented at the trial court, in clear violation of Utah law. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§ 41-6-38 GIVEN THE FACTS PRESENTED 
Under Utah Law, for an owner or possessor of livestock to be 
liable for damage resulting from their presence on a highway, the 
owner must have contributed to the animal's presence there in a 
tangible and direct way. Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-38; see e.g. 
Hornsby v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop, supra; Lee v. Mitchell 
Funeral Home Ambulance Service, 606 P.2d 259 (Utah 1980); Rhiness 
v. Dansie, supra; Hvrum Smith Estate Co. v. Petersen, 227 F.2d 
4421 (10th Cir 1955) . Appellants failed to produce any evidence of 
any negligent acts on the part of Defendant Roseman,but rested on 
a theory of negligent omissions, which is contrary to Utah law. 
Appellants have also failed to cite any of the precedent setting 
cases in this area, ignoring the binding precedent that applies to 
cases involving collisions with livestock. 
With no duty imposed under these circumstances by the general 
law, we next should examine whether Respondent assumed any higher 
duty. This duty would need to come from the arrangements between 
Defendants Roseman and Erickson. Under the terms of the pasturing 
agreement, Defendant Roseman was obligated to maintain the fences 
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and gates in the condition that they were in when he began 
pasturing his animal(s) there. He was not under any obligation to 
improve the property, and the owner, Defendant Quinn Erickson, was 
responsible for the original construction and any improvements. It 
was uncontested that fence was maintained adequately, and it has 
been alleged by Plaintiffs that the horse used the gate to leave 
the pasture. Appellants failed to show a breach of any duty to 
either the appellants or to Defendant Erickson in this case which 
properly was dismissed on a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
This case is governed by the law established in the above 
cited statute and cases. The rule explicitly set forth in these 
cases, is that the term "permit11 means that the owner must directly 
allow, sanction or encourage the animal to be in the road, with the 
owner's knowledge and consent. See Hornsby, 758 P. 2d 929 at 935 
(specifically adopting the interpretation in Santanello v. Cooper, 
475 P.2d 246 (Ariz. 1970). 
The Supreme Court was clear when it stated the law. Rhiness 
v. Dansie. 472 P.2d 428 at 429-430.: 
"In order for the plaintiffs to recover in this 
action, they must show two things: First, that the 
highway was fenced on both sides; and second that the 
horses got onto the highway through the negligence of the 
defendant . The mere fact that the animals escaped from 
the enclosure is not sufficient evidence, standing alone, 
to justify the submission of defendant's negligence to 
the jury. 
The facts here are nearly identical to those in Rhiness. Here, The 
Appellants have stated that a horse was on the highway, and 
therefore, the enclosure was negligent. There is no record of any 
animal escaping from the subject enclosure before this incident. 
7 
(R202) Appellants, relying upon argument made by their counsel 
for the first time at oral argument in this matter, unsupported by 
Affidavits, have attempted to raise an issue of fact at this time. 
(R 289) This assertion is not evidence and should not be 
considered. Even if this Court considers that a neighbor of Mr. 
Erickson's once returned a horse to the property, this still does 
not show affirmative acts of negligence on Mr. Roseman's part. 
Appellants asserted below that Defendant Roseman was negligent 
in boarding his horse in a pasture with only a latch to secure the 
gate. That position was correctly rejected as not supported by 
Utah law. Rhiness, supra. 
Respondent Roseman agreed to maintain the property in 
question, and it was uncontested at the time of summary judgment 
that the property did not deteriorate during the time of the lease. 
Plaintiffs1 expert stated that the fences had been repaired 
sufficiently. Respondent Roseman fulfilled his duties under the 
lease, and any claims that the latch was "woefully insufficient11 
should be made against the designer and builder of the latch, 
Defendant Erickson. All that has been presented in this case has 
been speculative opinions unsupported by factual evidence. (R212-
198) 
There was no evidence presented that the gate was open the 
night of the accident. Appellants1 expert stated that the gate 
would fall open, if not properly latched. (R 203) However, this 
would indicate, at most, that the last person to close the gate may 
not have secured it properly, or that the gate was not secured 
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properly. There is no evidence that the halter, or body part of 
the horse, came into contact with the latch. (R 2 02) 
There are no witnesses, evidence or other facts to support 
Johnson's opinion. (R 202) All that Johnson actually observed was 
that if the gate was not properly closed, it could fall open. 
(R203-202) 
These unsupported opinions do not amount to a charge of 
negligence. There is no duty under Utah law to devise a self-
latching, self-locking apparatus on a pasture gate. No latch will 
hold a gate closed if not properly secured. It may be true that 
the last person to leave the pasture should be careful to secure 
the gate, but Appellants provided no evidence as to that person's 
identity. It was undisputed at the time of summary judgment that 
it was possible that someone could have opened the gate without 
Defendant Erickson's knowledge. If this could be done without the 
resident of the property knowing, it would seem even more likely 
that it could happen without the knowledge of an absent party, 
Respondent Roseman. Appellants failed at the time of summary 
judgment to show any dispute as to the facts, and failed to show 
any facts supporting a finding of negligence on the part of 
Defendant Roseman. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary Judgment was properly granted in this matter. 
Appellants have attempted to raise issues of contested fact by 
presenting evidence not given to the trial Court. Under the facts 
presented, Appellants failed to make a prima facie case of 
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negligence as specifically stated in Utah law, specifically, they 
failed to show any affirmative acts by Respondent Roseman 
sanctioning the presence of his horse on the highway. Rhiness v. 
Dansie, 472 P.2d 428 at 429-430. 
Wherefore, Respondent Roseman respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the decision of the trial Court dismissing this 
action. 
Dated this 3c^ day of ^TI^^,r^? 1995. i 
Respectfully submit€&d, 
HOLLAND 
for Respondent Roseman. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent Kevin Roseman were mailed, postage 
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Bradley Parker, Esq. 
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